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The Appellants Robert & Jackie Face respectfully submits our brief
on appeal.
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to
Sections 78-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated, the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction" and "the Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals
any matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of
the June 28, 2006 Order and Final Judgment by Judge Lindberg attached.
The ultimate legal questions involve whether the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing appellant's case with prejudice, whether imperative
Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 74. were violated in regard to
withdrawal of counsel after certificate of readiness for trial had been filed,
whether appellants, namely Robert L. Face an American with disability
involving a brain injury unable to represent himself, rights of due process
were violated and if as an accommodation under the Americans with
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Disability Act the court erred in not ensuring that Robert L. Face maintain
representation.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, OR RULES
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, Article I § 7;
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION, AMENDMENT V;
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV;
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES, RULE

V

74 (2004).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is a personal injury case involving Mr. Robert Face and his wife
Mrs. Jackie Face. Mr. Face was a productive hard working provider for his family
employed by utility company for more than 25 years. Mr. Face worked his way up
to a journeyman substation electrician status earning near a six figure income. Just
at a point in the Faces lives when they were beginning to enjoying the fruits of
their labors, an accident at the hands of respondents, turned there lives upside
down. Mr. Face, now totally disabled, sustained a severe brain injury, leaving him
helpless and dependant upon his wife and family for most and at times all of his
needs and care. Mr. Face cannot work or represent himself. Mrs. Face cares for
her husband and family while working endless hours to survive on a fraction of
what Mr. Face was providing prior to injuries. In the pursuit of justice, we
encountered our court system for the first time. While we have always held high
regard to the important function our courts serve, errors encountered by the lower
court has left us in dismay and disbelief. It is apparent to us that the lower court
system was more interested in ramming our case to end than ensure protection of
our right to be heard and have our day in court. It has been difficult to raise money
and time for Robert to undergo all testing, diagnostic and evaluations necessary to
properly assess causation of Robert's brain injury in relation to the accident and
determine Robert's long term prospects. We believe that the complexities of this
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case are unique, based upon limited knowledge in the area of Roberts type of brain
injury, requiring more time than the average injury case. We know our case was
actively pursued based upon costs and time expended up through shortly after
settlement negotiations were under way. We believe that pressures applied by the
lower court resulted with our counsel filing a questionable certificate of readiness
for trial and then without justification or reason withdrew from the case absent our
knowledge, consent or input. Said pressures also served to advantage respondent
involving a large insurance company equipped with unlimited resources to retain
high priced defense counsel not interested injustice but rather disposal of our case
which was accomplished in just a little more than three years.
During one proceeding the court assured us that we would receive the time
we need to find counsel, then respondents filed a motion to dismiss days after
prospective replacement counsel contacted Mr. Plant. We only knew to file a
motion for enlargement to allow counsel to respond considering Robert is unable
to respond or represent himself and we were moving forward as we understood the
court advised. At time of dismissal, our case was being reviewed by another
prospective attorney. Respondent's motion to dismiss left out two important facts:
1) their counsel had been by prospective attorney contacted which verified
we were actively pursuing replacement counsel; and
2) Judge Himonas stated in open court "No problem, I will give you the time
you need." (relative to the obtainment of new counsel)
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What law firm really wants a case prepared by other counsel all the way to a
questionable certificate of readiness for trial which also has is subject to a lien?
We submit that the court erred in allowing our counsel to withdraw in an arbitrary
and capricious manner inconsistent with imperative provisions under Rule 74 Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. We also believe and the record reflects that both officers
of the court misled and misrepresented facts resulting in errors. We have faith that
checks and balances safeguarded through our higher courts will correct the
injustice our case encountered upon having been dismissed with prejudice.
Respondents inactions to move the case forward themselves, rather filing a motion
to dismiss after we lost counsel, days after prospective replacement counsel
contacted them, was not only unethical but also smacks of an ambush tactic.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is based upon the record of this case in the pleadings
of the parties, including memorandum and supporting addenda in the lower court.
1. 03-14-03:

Complaint filed (R. 1-8);

2. 04-10-03:

Answer filed (R. 9-13);

DISCOVERY PROCESS BASED UPON RECORD INDEX
3. 04-22-03:

PLAINTIFF'S subpoenas records from American Fork Hospital

& Work Care (R. 16-21);
4. 06-09-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Rule 26 (a)(1) Initial Disclosures ( R. 40-42);
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5. 06-10-03:

DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service Initial Disclosures ( R.

43);
6. 06-13-03:

DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service for Discovery ( R. 44)

7. 06-16-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Rule 45

(b)(4) Request ( R. 45-46);
8. 06-16-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Plaintiff s Rule 26 (a)(1)

Supplemental Initial Disclosures ( R. 47-48);
9. 06-18-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate for Written Discovery and Notice of

Deposition for Byron Chester Mock ( R. 49-50);
10.06-25-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Services of Plaintiff s Second Rule

45(b)(4) (R. 51-52);
11.06-26-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Amended Notice of

Deposition of Defendant Byron Mock ( R. 53-54);
12.07-09-03:

DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service for Discovery ( R. 55-56)

13.07-28-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service for Discovery ( R. 59-60)

14. 08-06-03: DEFENDANT'S Notice of Deposition ( R. 61-62);
15.08-26-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Services of Second Amended

Notice of Deposition ( R. 63-64);
16.08-26-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Byron

Mock ( R. 65-66)
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17.09-09-03:

DEFENDANT'S Amended Notice of Deposition (R. 67-68);

18.10-06003:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service for Written Discovery

Second set of Production and Interrogatory and Notice of Deposition ( R. 6970);
19.10-28-03:

PLAINTIFF'S Second Set of Supplemental Rule 26(a)(1) Initial

Disclosures ( R. 71-72;
20.11-03-03

DEFENDANT'S Notice of continued Deposition (R. 73-74)

21.11-07-03

DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service for Discovery (R. 75);

22.11-11-03:

DEFENDANT'S Amended Notice of continued Deposition ( R.

76-77)
23.05-17-04:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Plaintiff s Expert

Witness designation ( R. 91-92);
24.06-28-04

DEFENDANT'S Notice of Depositions (R. 93-96);

25.08-20-04

DEFENDANT'S Notice of Deposition ( R. 97-98);

26.09-16-04

DEFENDANT'S Notice of Deposition ( R. 99-100);

27.09-30-04

DEFENDANT'S Offer of Judgment ( R. 101-102);

28.12-30-04

DEFENDANT'S Amended Notice of Deposition ( R. 103-104);

29.08-15-04:

PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Readiness for Trial ( R. 108-110);

30. Appellant was represented by Charles A. Gruber from the onset of the
complaint up and through September 23, 2005. (See Index Record pages 1-8,
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117 - 120) This representation was based upon a contractual agreement
entered into between the parties.
31 .Appellant Robert L. Face has a brain injury and the court was advised by his
physician that he is unable to represent himself. (Index Record page 135)
{Emphasis Added}
32.Discovery consisted of all phases of discovery. On September 15, 2005, a
hearing took place, which was suppose to be a scheduling conference,
however, no one can determine exactly what occurred at this time. (R.l 14116)
33.Plaintiff timely requested a transcript of the September 15, 2005 hearing. (R.
176 - 177), however no transcript of the September 15, 2005 hearing has been
produced. (R. 181 -183)
34.On September 16, 2005, a hearing was held before Judge Deno Himonas
without any notice to the appellants. (See index)
35.During September 16, 2005 hearing, Judge Himonas asked "... I understand,
Mr. Gruber that you intend to withdraw. (Transcript September 16, 2005,
hearing page 2, line 15-16)
36. Appellant's prior counsel responded, "I will withdraw at the direction of my
clients, your Honor ...." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 2, line
17-18)
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37. At no time did appellants direct or consent to Charles A. Gruber withdrawal,
nor does the record reflect that the appellants requested Mr. Gruber withdraw
as appellants counsel. (See the transcript and record)
38.When Mr. Gruber stated, "my clients honestly want someone else." The Court
responded, "I'm not concerned about that." and followed it up with "Yeah, not
concerned about it at all." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 4,
lines 1 - 4)
39.Respondent's counsel, who had been attempting to settle the case,
acknowledged having conversation with Mr. Gruber concerning withdrawal of
appellant's counsel by stating "... Mr. Gruber explained that yesterday very
well." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 3, line 16)
40.Mr. Plant prompted the court to move forward. (Transcript September 16,
2005, hearing page 4, line 6 - 8 )
41.The Court ordered, "So why don't we say 20 days from today in which to
appear or appoint counsel." Well, let's have it 20 days from today in which to
appear or appoint." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 4, line 9 10,22-23,25-26)
42.Mr. Plant verified that the court wanted "... And so let me make sure, your
Honor, so I don't mess up the order, doing 3:30 on the 18th as a scheduling
conference, and they have 20 days from today to appoint new counsel or
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appear in person, right? The Court: "Yes"(Transcript September 16, 2005,
hearing page 6, line 3)
43. The Court asked, "... if Mr. Gruber were to withdraw right now there would
be an automatic 20 day period in which he would be required to give notice."
(Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 6, line 8-10)
44.Mr. Plant responded "Right." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 6,
line 11)
45.On September 1, 2004, Mr. Gruber verified in writing the fact "that he would
be there until the end." (R. 130 - 134)
46. On September 23, 2005, Mr. Gruber filed his notice of withdrawal. (R. 117120)
47.On September 27, 2005, respondent's counsel filed Notice to appear or
appoint counsel within 20 days. (R. 121 - 122)
48.On September 28, 2005, respondent's counsel obtained signature of Judge
Himonas requiring plaintiffs to find new counsel or appear in person on or
before October 5, 2005 while setting a scheduling conference to be held on
October 18, 2005 at 3:30 p.m. to establish a discovery plan and if possible set
the matter for trial. (R. 123 - 125)
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49.Plaintiff s filed an ex-parte motion for enlargement of time to respond on
October 17, 2005 along with attached affidavit and letter from Dr. Joe
Murdock, M.D. (R. 128 - 135)
50.Court proceeded with hearing October 17, 2005.
51 .Appellant Jackie Face informed the Court that".. .We certainly do not want to
be pro se." (Transcript October 17, 2005, hearing page 4, lines 10 - 11)
52.The Court responded "I understand, and I, ... No problem, I'll give you the
time that you need." "That's no problem. So why don't you - when you
obtain Counsel if you would do me the courtesy — (Transcript October 17,
2005, hearing page 4, lines 12, 14 - 15, 17- 18).
53.Jackie responded "Certainly will." (Transcript October 17, 2005, hearing
page 4, line 19)
54.On February 14, 2006, respondent filed motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. (R. 150- 153)
55.Appellants filed motion for additional time to have new counsel respond to
defendant's motion to dismiss and attached affidavit February 27, 2006. (R.
154-157)
56. After respondent noticed motion to dismiss for decision and having not
received any response to pending motion for enlargement Ms. Face noticed
for decision learning that case had been dismissed ( Exhibit A).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Lindberg erred by failing to show facts rising to the level which
supports or justifies dismissal of our case with prejudice, considering our case
involves a disabled person with a brain injury unable to act or represent himself.
The lower court erred in granting respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice,
and by erroneously concluding that "any injustice resulting from this dismissal lies
solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs." (R. 160 - 164) Judge Lindberg
acknowledged "In fact, it is telling that they have not even attempted to respond to
the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants in February 2006, other than to again
ask for an extension of time." "Once their counsel withdrew, Plaintiffs received
repeated extensions to appoint new counsel, all the while protesting that they could
not represent themselves." (R. 160 - 164, paragraph 12 and 14).
Some of the pertinent facts not addressed in the memorandum decision
include:
(1) plaintiffs counsel was allowed to withdraw in an arbitrary and
capricious manner absent plaintiffs knowledge, consent or input (R. 130-134);
(2) The pending extension of time was seeking the court to allow new
counsel to respond;
(3) Robert L. Face is disabled with a brain injury unable or in any condition
to represent himself or respond (R. 135);
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(4) both parties were involved in ongoing settlement discussions (101 - 102);
(5) new discovery involving causation of brain injury was being explored;
(6) complexities of a case involving a brain injury;
(7) Prior Judge Himonus statement "No problem, I will give you the time
you need.";
(8) lower court failure to rule on pending motion for enlargement of time;
(9) respondent's counsel having failed to prepare an order as agreed and
specifically instructed by the court during September 16, 2005 hearing;
(10) after certificate of readiness was filed respondents failures to take action
in moving case forward, other than filing a motion to dismiss after plaintiffs lost
their counsel; and
(11) No hearing having been held in relation to disposing of plaintiff s case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW
DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO ENSURE THAT MANDATORY
PROVISIONS, WHICH ARE CLASSIFIED AS IMPERATIVES UNDER
RULE 74 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WERE FOLLOWED.
While appellants understanding is that Section 78-51-36, U.C.A. 1953 has
been repealed, similar language is contained under Rule 74 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is reasonable to conclude that Rule 74 was enacted to provide similar
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if not identical protections. The court in Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1977)
"The foregoing clearly appears to have been enacted to safeguard a litigant
who finds himself without counsel and prevents further proceedings until he again
has counsel and chooses to proceed pro se. It is not a court directive nor does it
exact any penalty against the litigant who fails for one reason or another to engage
new counsel since, by its own terms, it affords him the alternative of appearing in
person. Consequently, when a litigant does fail to engage new counsel, that, in and
of itself, is not an adequate basis to default him or to dismiss as against him with
prejudice."
The court first declares that the foregoing was "enacted to safeguard a
litigant who finds himself without counsel and prevent proceedings until he again
has counsel or chooses to proceed pro se." Simply put, the district court in this
action should not have proceeded until either the appellants retained counsel or
choose to proceed pro se. The later "choose to proceed pro se" is a clear issue that
can be resolve first. Appellant, Mrs. Face made it clear to the court that".. .We
certainly do not want to be proceed pro se." I further made it clear that my
husband could not appear or represent himself due to his disability. In fact, I
provided the court with a letter indicating he "could not represent himself." by his
physician.
Like in this action, neither appellants can or want to represent ourselves
because we lack necessary skills to prosecute this action to a successful conclusion.
That is the reason why we hired a professional. Appellant, Ms. Face made it clear
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to the court that neither I nor my husband could represent ourselves. Especially
considering, Mr. Face is disabled with a serious and debilitating brain injury.
The record reflects that appellant Mrs. Face made diligent and continued
efforts to obtain an attorney, but could not find one. This was conveyed to the
court. Therefore, under both of the aforementioned criteria the court should not
have proceeded until one of the two conditions were met. This is where the district
court clearly abused its discretion in dismissing this action.
Lastly, the court made it clear when it stated,
"It is not a court directive nor does it exact any penalty against the litigant
who fails for one reason or another to engage new counsel since, by its own terms,
it affords him the alternative of appearing in person. Consequently, when a litigant
does fail to engage new counsel, that, in and of itself, is not an adequate basis to
default him or to dismiss as against him with prejudice."
The lower court failed to adhere to the high court directions. The lower
court punished appellants because they did not or could not find counsel. The high
court also made it clear that a court will not dismiss an action based solely on the
failure to engage counsel. That is the exact reason why the lower court dismissed
this action.
After having litigated this case to the filing of a questionable certificate of
readiness for trial, the lower court states ".. .counsel for Plaintiffs informed the
Court that he would be withdrawing as counsel." (R. 160 - 164 paragraph 7) Judge
Lindberg does not refer to or cite which telephonic conference this matter relates
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too. More importantly, appellant's counsel failed to motion the court and obtain an
order for withdrawal, which is mandatory under Rule 74 U.R.C.P..1
No record of the September 15, 2005, conference has been made available.
During a hearing held September 16, 2005, the court stated ".. .All right. I
understand, Mr. Gruber, that you intend to withdraw?" Mr. Gruber responded ".. .1
will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor.". The record is silent as
to appellants ever directing Mr. Gruber to withdraw.

The court failed to require

plaintiffs prior counsel to submit any motion for withdrawal to obtain court order
allowing withdrawal as required which would have alerted us to the fact our
counsel was withdrawing. This would have afforded us an opportunity to be heard.
While everyone should be afforded this most reasonable accommodation, Mr. Face
is disabled with a brain injury unable to represent himself (R. 135). Further, in
addition to requiring a motion to withdraw, Rule 74 U.R.C.P. (2004) also required
counsel to obtain an order from the court. The record is silent as to any motion or
order for withdrawal. To be in compliance with Rule 74 U.R.C.P. appellants
1

Rule 74(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures (2005) states,
"If a motion is not pending or a certificate for readiness of trial has been filed, an
attorney may withdraw from a case by filing with the court ands served upon all
parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address
of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no certificate
of readiness for trial has been filed. If a motion is pending or certificate of
readiness for trial has been filed, an attorney may not withdraw except upon
motion and order of the court. The motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of
any pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing."
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submit that we were entitled to notice of the motion so as to allow us an
opportunity to be heard. Appellants submit that Mr. Gruber's statement".. .1 can
assure you this isn't a tactic, and I know Terry knows this that I wouldn't do this,
but it's not - it's my clients honestly want someone else." (R. 182 pages 3 & 4,
lines 25, 26, 1) was a confession for we were not even aware this would or was
taking place. Appellants can not understand the courts response "I'm not
concerned about that.", "Yeah, not concerned about it at all." ( R. 182 pages 4,
lines 2 & 4). Mr. Gruber had obviously not filed a motion to withdraw based upon
the record and his earlier statement ""I will withdraw at the direction of my clients,
your Honor" (R. 182 page 2, lines 17 & 18). After a certificate of readiness was
filed, why would the court consider allowing Mr. Gruber to withdraw absent any
motion, questions or at least input by appellants?
BOTH COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF'S (OFFICERS
OF THE COURT) FAILED TO FOLLOW IMPARITIVE PROVISIONS
UNDER RULE 74 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES.
While both counsel for plaintiffs and defendants knew or should have known
procedures required for withdrawal under Rule 74 U.R.C.P., neither officer of the
court ensured that imperative provisions were complied with. Appellants sought
transcript of the September 15, 2005, hearing of which no record has been made
available (R. 176 - 177, 181). On September 16, 2005, one month following
plaintiff having filed a certificate of readiness for trial without plaintiffs
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knowledge, a hearing was held (R. 182) wherein the court stated ".. .All right. I
understand, Mr. Gruber, that you intend to withdraw?" Mr. Gruber responded ".. .1
will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor." Again, at no time have
appellants ever directed Mr. Gruber to withdraw (R. 130 - 134). When Mr. Gruber
stated that my clients honestly want someone else...." The court responded "I'm
not concerned about that." and followed it up with "Yeah, not concerned about it at
all." (R. 182 page 4, lines 1 - 4). Respondent's counsel who had been attempting
to settle this case, acknowledged having conversation, absent any motion for
withdrawal, with Mr. Gruber stating ".. .Mr. Gruber explained that yesterday very
well."(R. 182 pages 3, line 16). Respondents counsel then prompted the court to
move forward (R. 182 page 4, line 6 - 8). When the Court asked ".. .if Mr. Gruber
were to withdraw right now there would be an automatic 20 day period in which he
would be required to give notice — Mr. Plant responded "Right." (R. 182 pages 6,
lines 8 - 11). Appellants have been unable to confirm Mr. Plant's verification to
the court for Rule 74 U.R.C.P. does not state that our counsel is allowed 20 days to
file notice but rather Rule 74 U.R.C.P. mandates that once the certificate of
readiness for trial was filed, appellant's counsel may not withdraw without first
filing a motion to withdraw and obtaining a court order. It is reasonable to
conclude that said motion is designed to allow litigants an opportunity to be heard
and lodge any objections. The record in this case is clear that plaintiffs prior
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counsel filed a certificate of readiness for trial on 08-15-05 (R. 108 - 110). The
record is silent that any motion for withdrawal was ever filed as required or does
the record reflect any court order specifically granting any such motion.
Respondent's counsel goes further to confuse issues by agreeing to prepare an
order (R. 182 page 4, lines 17, 18, 25, 26, page 5, lines 25, 26, page 6, lines 1, 2, 3,
17, 18) consistent with directions of the court during the September 16, 2005
hearing. The record is silent as to any order in compliance with instructions of the
court. Officers of the Court moved forward in a manner both arbitrary and
capricious violating mandatory provisions set forth under Rule 74 (a) and (b)
U.R.C.P. (2004) and lower court instructions. Instead, on September 28, 2005
respondents counsel obtained the court's signature of an order based upon
September 15, 2005 (no record) requiring plaintiffs to appear or appoint counsel
within seven (7) days on or before October 5, 2005. The following day Mr. Plant
then files a notice to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days? We didn't even
receive notices 20 days prior to scheduled October 18, 2005 hearing (R. 130 - 134).
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POINT II
DISTRICT COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE CLAIMING NO SUBSTANTIAL
WORK ON CASE FOR EIGHTEEN (18) MONTHS WAS AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION
Judge Lindberg cited Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W.
Lars en Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)( R. 160 - 164 paragraph
11) in her memorandum decision (R. 160-164 paragraph 11). Said case does not
support dismissal with prejudice in this instance. In that case, supra, motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed sixteen (16) months after commencement
of the lawsuit (after no proceedings other than a motion to dismiss), wherein the
court denied the motion. In this action, the record is replete with evidence that
plaintiffs performed interrogatories, admissions, production of documents,
subpoenas and depositions in addition to law and motion over the initial twenty
(20) months (See Relevant Statement of Facts above). Under the above referenced
case, approximately fifteen (15) months later (during which time some discovery
took place) a second motion to dismiss was granted. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for trial stating in part as follows (at page 879):
"it is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even more
important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of courts is to
afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In
conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to favor granting relief
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from default judgment where there isn't any reasonable excuse, unless it will result
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party."
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to give proper weight to the
higher priority; and that under the circumstances herein, the order of dismissal with
prejudice was an abuse of discretion." (Emphases Added).
In addition to mere length of time since the suit was filed, lower court also
cites five factors ( R. 160-164, paragraph 11) to be utilized when determining
whether or not justifiable excuse exists for the delay in moving the case along as
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, designed to help determine whether a party
has shown a justifiable excuse for its failure to prosecute as follows:
1. conduct of both parties;
2. opportunity each party has had to move the case forward;
3. what each party has done to move the case forward;
4. the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the
other side; and
5. most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
When applying these rules to our case it appears that the scales tip heavily in
favor of vacating the order of dismissal and remanding the case for further
proceedings or in the alternative the dismissal be reversed and ordered as without
prejudice to the commencement of a new lawsuit. (1) Based upon the record,
appellant's do not understand or agree with lower court's assessment that".. .what
19

discovery has occurred it appears to have been driven primarily by the defendants"
(R. 160-164, paragraph 13). The record is clear that both parties pursued discovery
of which appellant's initiated discovery (See Relevant Statement of Facts above).
Appellants accommodated Appellees delays during discovery due to Mr. Mock's
health condition through rescheduling of his deposition (R. 49 - 50, 53 - 54 and 65
- 66). While appellees may have performed more depositions, appellants bore
costs and time necessary for Robert Face to undergo testing, diagnostics and
evaluations of injuries through numerous physicians. Appellants take issue with
lower courts averments that we failed to fulfill our repeated promises and was
totally non responsive since February, 2006. We diligently sought new counsel.
Who wants a case prepared by counsel who files a certificate for readiness of trial
and then was allowed to abandon the case, which also has a lien filed against it.
Appellants disagree with lower court's assumption "Defendants apparently ran out
of patience and filed present motion..." ( R. 160 - 164 paragraph 9). It was
conveyed to appellants that the attorney reviewing our case in February, 2006
contacted Mr. Plant who just days thereafter filed the motion to dismiss knowing
we were actively seeking replacement counsel, remembering the court advised "No
problem, I will give you the time that you need.". In response appellants filed a
motion for enlargement to have counsel respond, remembering that Mr. Face is
disabled with a brain injury unable to represent himself. Respondent's motion

20

served to further frustrate and discourage any attorney from wanting to take the
case. While the court accused us of being silent, it is our understanding that we
only had ten days to respond to a motion which we did in filing the motion for
enlargement. Appellees were silent in failing to respond or object until June, 2006.
Appellants did not understand the process and were awaiting a response from
either the court or respondent while seeking counsel as the court had instructed.
Shortly after receiving respondents notice for decision we attempted to file a notice
for decision on our pending motion learning that the case had been dismissed (See
attached exhibit A above). Respondents conduct is transparent when reviewing
their response to our motion for enlargement to file opening brief in this court.
Facts were misrepresented while attempting to dictate to this court how much time
a disabled person with a brain injury needs to prepare a brief of such complexity;
(2) Appellants were definitely subjected to a distinct disadvantage after their
counsel was allowed to withdraw because Mr. Face is disabled with a brain injury
unable to act or represent himself ( R. 135) while respondent on the other hand was
allowed to ignore the court's order allowing us time to find counsel. In fact the
week prior to the October 18, 2005 hearing, after Mr. Plant agreed to an extension
he conveyed that our problem would be the court who wanted to get rid of our
case. After the hearing, we felt Mr. Plant had misrepresented what was really
going on. Respondents were also at a distinct advantage having deposed plaintiffs
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knowing there financial situation prevented us from paying for counsel to appeal;
(3) The record is silent as to ongoing settlement discussions other than defendants
offer of judgment but does indicate appellees having done nothing since
December, 2004 other than attend a telephone conference failing to prepare the
order of the court as specifically agreed and advised during the September 16,
2005 hearing (See section B. below). Respondent also discontinued prospect of
settling case. Why settle if one can succeed in getting the court to throw out
opponent's case. After appellant's attorney filed certificate of readiness for trial
08-15-05 (R. 108 - 110) and was allowed to withdraw the following month (R. 117
- 120) the record is clear that appellant's continued to diligently seek counsel (R.
134-135, 182 page 4, lines 7 - 19, 141 - 143, 154-157). While both parties
attended the October 18, 2005 telephonic conference appellees did nothing more to
move case forward other than file a motion for dismissal. Appellants continued
diligently seeking replacement counsel as instructed by the court ( R. 134 - 135,
182 page 4, lines 7 - 19, 141 - 143, 154 - 157); (4) Appellants were subjected to
extreme difficulties once their counsel was allowed to withdraw because Mr. Face
is disabled with a brain injury unable to act or represent himself while appellees
were at distinct advantage; (5) most important, appellants have been subjected to
enormous injustice upon having our case foreclosed upon wherein significant time
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energy and costs were expended as well as loosing relief sought while appellees
reap the benefit of no further need to settle having escaped justice.
Appellants believe that respondents took advantage of the rotation of judges
for if Judge Himonus felt we were beyond limits, we believe he would have called
for a hearing prior to dismissing our case. As for time lapse from January, 2005,
appellants were advised that the courts favor settlement of cases if possible. We
had no idea that our case was at risk when it was dismissed based upon the court
granting us the time we needed. We knew we were doing all possible to replace
counsel. One can only imagine the chilling effect which would occur if litigants
are discouraged from taking time necessary to attempt settlements for fear of
having our cases dismissed for inaction. While dismissal under some of the cases
cited in Westinghouse case, supra; justified dismissal such as Thompson Ditch Co.
v. Jackson. 29 Utah.2d 259, 508 P. 2d 528 (1973) (dismissal after 8 years delay
affirmed); and Brasher Motor & Finance v. Brown, 23 Utah.2d 247, 461 P.2d 464
(1969) (5 1/2 years delay with no activity justified dismissal) others cited do not
such as Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah.2d 389, 885 P. 2d 624
(1959); (8 years delay did not authorize dismissal) and Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah
588, 150 P. 956 (1915) (3 year delay was insufficient). Our case was not subject to
years of delays.
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FAILURE TO OBTAIN COUNSEL
It is unjust to reward respondent with dismissal when they failed to prepare
an order as agreed and specifically instructed by the court, move forward with
withdrawal of counsel outside mandated provisions under Rule 74 U.R.C.P. failing
to object to withdrawal or move the case forward themselves and then just days
after receiving a call from counsel, plaintiffs were attempting to retain, motioned a
new Judge for dismissal less than 120 days after Judge Himonus stated he would
afford plaintiffs the time needed to obtain counsel. Respondents too had delayed
the case through rescheduling defendant Mock's deposition to accommodate his
health condition (See above). We did not understand Mr. Gruber's statement that
the court forced said certificate rather it is apparent that he disappeared shortly
thereafter. In January, 2005 discovery was near completion with exception to
newly discovered information involving causation of Robert's brain injury as it
related to the accident. Appellants attended appointments in January 2005 and Dr.
Matsuo was evaluating further testing which we understand has not been
completed. We were advised that our case was engaged in ongoing settlement
discussions beginning in late 2004 within 60 days of having received respondent's
offer of judgment (R. 101 - 102). Just prior to withdrawal we received information
that our prior counsel, having been a sole practitioner, was unable to fulfill his
contractual obligations at which time shortly thereafter we agreed to get a second
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opinion to determine whether we should settle for an amount Mr. Gruber said
appellees would accept. At no time did we discuss withdrawal which was
accomplished absent our knowledge, consent and input. Both counsel moved
forward with withdrawal absent their having objections. We provided the court
with a letter from our primary physician who explained Mr. Face's inability to
represent himself (R. 135) while Ms. Face informed the court during October 18,
2005 hearing ".. .We most certainly do not want to be pro se." (R. 183 page 4, lines
10 and 11). The court responded "No problem. I'll give you the time you need." (
R. 182, page 4, lines 14 and 15). We interpreted the court's statement to mean just
that. We diligently sought new counsel and continued to do so (R. 182, page 4,
lines 7-10, 154-157).
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE AND WAS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Under Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah.2d 1, 354, P. 2d
559, 561. when a party is subject to dismissal with prejudice based upon record,
said dismissal must be supported by evidence when viewed in light most favorable
to party subject to dismissal. That no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment of dismissal as a matter of law. When
applying this rule to the facts of this case, one must conclude that no unreasonable
delay occurred when appellants were engaged in genuine settlement discussions up
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until shortly before their counsel was allowed to withdraw and had diligently
performed discovery up through that same year. This case has not sat dormant in
the court system for years but rather was actively pursued when possible. Totality
of circumstances also tip the scales heavily in favor of vacating the order of
dismissal and remanding the case for trial or in the alternative the dismissal should
be ordered as without prejudice to the commencement of a new lawsuit. That
appellants diligently sought counsel after our counsel had been allowed to
withdraw which was our understanding as to what the court advised. Under
Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747. when* appraising a dismissal
granted against appellants, we are entitled to have all the evidence reviewed,
together with every logical inference which may fairly be drawn there from in the
light most favorable to us. This was not a case of unreasonable neglect.
POINT III
PLAITIFFfS RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS WERE VIOLATED IN HAVING
BEEN DENIED OUR DAY IN COURT OR TO BE HEARD
Amendment V of the United States Constitution states, "No person
shall.. .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
without due process of law." This is echoed through the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution and our State Constitution.
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The appellants through this action has had our due process rights violated.
The most current and vital is the due process violation that encompasses and
surround the withdrawal of their counsel.
Rule 74 U.R.C.P. states, "If a motion is not pending or a certificate for
readiness of trial has been filed, an attorney may withdraw from a case by filing
with the court and served upon all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of
withdrawal shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no
motion is pending and no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. If a
motion is pending or certificate of readiness for trial has been filed, an
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court The
motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the
date and purpose of any scheduled hearing,"
In this action, a certificate of readiness for trial was filed with the court.
Under the rules it specifically forbids an attorney from withdrawing from a case
except upon motion and order of the court. The withdrawing counsel would be
required to serve the motion upon the other parties to properly give notice of the
impending withdrawal. Those parties would then be given an opportunity to
respond and be heard concerning the matter.
In this case, appellants counsel did not prepare, execute or serve a motion to
withdraw as is required under the rule. Counsel most definitely failed to notify the
parties. The actions of appellees counsel, cited above, was just as abusive,
underhanded and unethical tactics. This violated our rights to notice and to be
heard. Both counsel failed to comply with the requirements while appellants
counsel knew we did not fire or release him from his contractual obligations in this
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action. Appellants counsel has breached the contractual agreement, which is
binding in this case and appellants counsel knew the only way out of this action
was to seek judicial approval. However, this does not negate the contractual
obligations appellants counsel had with the appellants. Additionally, both counsel
failed to comply with nearly every provision of the rule.
Rule 74 is a rule that utilizes an "Imperative." The rule clearly states, "...,
an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court." This
did not happen.
Therefore, this alone should be reason for this court to reverse this action
and remand it back to the trial court for further proceedings. It should also be
grounds for this court to order Mr. Gruber's withdrawal null and void.
POINT IV
COURTS FAILURE TO ENSURE APPELLES WERE PROTECTED
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT OF 1990 "ADA" WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
To qualify under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 "ADA" a
person must establish the following:
1. A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual;
2. A record of such an impairment; or
3. being regarded as having such an impairment.
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In this action appellant, Ms. Face established by way of letter from our
attending physician that Mr. Face has a severe brain injury. This letter meets the
requirements of paragraph 1 and 2 above.
Based on this information, the court should have taken more reasonable
steps in protecting his rights under this action. Instead the court effectively placed
a tremendous ongoing burden on appellant's shoulders by allowing counsel to
withdraw. Considering the facts of this action, the court for whatever reason then
forced such drastic remedy as to dismiss action with prejudice, not even having
held a hearing prior to doing so, to give appellants an opportunity to be heard and
cite their understandings. The lower court acknowledges that this is a harsh
remedy. The court was under a duty to protect the interests of appellants,
especially because Mr. Face is disabled
POINT V
RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS WARRANT COST AND FEES
Based upon respondent moving forward in violation of strict mandates
contained under Rule 74, U.R.C.P. for withdrawal of counsel, failure to prepare
order of September 16, 2005 hearing as specifically agreed and instructed by the
court, motioning new Judge for dismissal rather than first confer with plaintiffs, set
for hearing or acknowledge Judge Himonas advisement that the court would give
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plaintiffs the time needed to replace counsel appellants are seeking reimbursement
of all costs and expenses.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the appellants have been seriously harmed by and through the
actions of the trial court including actions of both attorneys. Appellants
respectfully request this court, in the interest of justice, to reverse the trial courts
order dismissing this action with prejudice and remand back for further
proceedings ordering Mr. Gruber's retention of counsel to allow appellants an
opportunity to be heard. In the alternative, reverse and dismiss without prejudice
to the commencement of a new lawsuit.
Dated this 5th day off ebniary 2007.

Robert L. Face

Uju M<

<\*&\

U_s
Jackie N. Face
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jackie N. Face, certify that on 02-05-07,1 served a copy of the attached
Opening Brief upon Terry M. Plant, the counsel for the appellees in this matter, by
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:

Terry M. Plant
PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANEL
136 East South Temple Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ROBERT AND JACKIE FACE ,
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE

Plaintiffs,
vs

Civ No 030905851
BEUTLER ENTERPRISES, INC , MOBILE
HOME TRANSPORTERS, and BYRON
CHESTER MOCK,
Defendants

Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

^[1
At issue before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss foi failuie to prosecute Aftei
reviewing the parties' pleadings the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the case with
prejudice, pursuant to Utah R Q v P 41(b)
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
TJ2
This case involves a suit filed on or about March 14, 2003 by Plaintiffs Robert and Jackie
Face alleging that defendants were negligent in the opeiation of a tractor-ti ail er causing peisonal
mjuiytoMr Face, and a loss of consortium claim on behalf of Mis Face
1J3
An attorney planning report and proposed scheduling oidei were submitted to the Court
on or about May 13, 2003, but the Court declined to enter the Older because the proposed older
exceeded the piesumptive time limits provided for by Court rules In its minute entry declining
to sign the proposed ordei the Court noted that absent good cause foi delay, the case would have
to be certified for trial within 330 days after the Answei was filed, oi the it would be dismissed
^|4
An amended Case Management Ordei was appioved by the Court on May 28, 2003
Pmsuant to that Order the parties indicated to the Court that the mattei would be leady for tual
byMaich5,2004
1J5
The parties exchanged initial disclosuies and conducted discoveiy though the balance of
2003 On or about December 23, 2003 the parties submitted a Stipulation and Joint Motion foi a
second amendment to the Case Management Older The Court accepted the stipulation and
signed the pioposed second amended Older That Order extended the leadmess foi trial date to
October 1,2004

TJ6
Based on the case record it appears that discovery continued through January 25, 2005.
After that date, no action appears to have taken place on the case, so the Court noticed the case
for an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") why the case should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. The OSC was scheduled for September 6, 2005. hi response, Plaintiffs' counsel filed
a certificate of readiness for trial and asked that the OSC hearing be stricken.
f7
The Court then scheduled a telephonic conference with the parties, at which time counsel
for Plaintiffs informed the Court that he would be withdrawing as counsel and Plaintiffs would
secure new counsel. As a result of that telephonic conference the Court ordered that Plaintiffs
find new counsel or appear pro se within 20 days. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74, defendants
filed their notice to appear or appoint successor counsel. A follow up telephonic scheduling
conference was scheduled for October 18, 2005 to finalize what needed to occur to bring the
matter to trial.
K8
On the day prior to the scheduled telephonic conference, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Enlargement of Time to Appoint Counsel, seeking a thirty (30) day extension. Defendants did not
oppose that extension, and Plaintiffs were then given until November 18, 2005 to secure new
counsel.
T|9
Again the day before that extension was to run out, Plaintiffs again filed another request
for extension of time, this time asking for an additional 60 days. Although there is no express
entry in the record, it appears that Defendants again acquiesced to the requested extension.
However, by February 14, 2006, Defendants apparently ran out of patience and filed the present
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).
1J10
On February 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a third affidavit and Motion for Extension of time,
this time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Since that time, Plaintiffs have taken no further
action to move this case forward. On June 16, 2006, Defendants filed a notice to submit on their
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs have not responded.
ANALYSIS
f 11
The plaintiff bears the duty to prosecute its case with due diligence. Charlie Brown
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If the
plaintiff fails to prosecute its case with due diligence, a trial court has discretion to dismiss the
plaintiffs case. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d
876, 879 (Utah 1975); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc., 740 P.2d at 1370. The Utah Supreme
Court has set forth factors to help trial courts determine whether a party has shown a justifiable
excuse for its failure to prosecute. In addition to the length of time that has lapsed, the relevant
considerations are: "(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has to move
the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544
P.2d at 879. These factors are not to be considered in isolation. Countiy Meadows Convalescent

Ctr v Utah Dept of Health, Div Of Health Care Fin , 851 P 2d 1212, 1215 (Utah Ct App
1993) Rather, the totality of the circumstances should be consideied when determining if an
action should be dismissed for failure to piosecute with due diligence Id
HI 2
As noted above, there has been no substantive action to move the case forwaid since
January 2005 when defendants conducted the last of then depositions of Mi Face's ti eating
physicians After the Court on its own motion scheduled the OSC healing, the Plaintiffs'
counsel certified the mattei foi trial and then withdrew Plaintiffs have been given extension
aftei extension to secuie new counsel, yet they have utterly failed to do so In fact, it is telling
that they have not even attempted to respond to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants in
Februaiy 2006, othei than to again ask for an extension of time
HI 3
It has been more than thiee (3) years since the case was filed, more than eighteen (18)
months since theie was any substantive work on this case (and what discovery has occuned it
appeals to have been driven primarily by the defendants), and ovei nine (9) months since the
Court initiated the OSC and Plaintiffs began seeking extensions of time The Court believes
enough is enough It is evident Plaintiffs have failed to fulfill their lepeated pi onuses to the
Court, and have been totally non-responsive since February 2006
TJ14
As lefeienced above, in evaluating a motion to dismiss the Court must considei what
actions, if any, weie taken by each side in oidei to move the case foiwaid In this case, Plaintiffs
weie clearly on notice of this Court's intention to manage its caseload and not allow mattei s to
languish foi yeais without action Once their counsel withdiew, Plaintiffs received repeated
extensions to appoint new counsel, all the while protesting that they could not repiesent
themselves
1J15
hi contrast to Plaintiffs' inaction, it appears that the defendants have actively pursued this
action They have engaged m substantial discovery, including deposing Mi Face's tieatment
pioviders
HI 6
Defendants have not addiessed how they will be prejudiced if this mattei is continued, but
that piong, by itself, is not determinative The bui Jen was on Plaintiffs to show why dismissal
would not be wan anted on these facts, or to offer reasonable excuse foi then lack of diligence
Based on Plaintiffs' failure to lespond to the motion to dismiss, and the fact they have remained
silent for the subsequent 5 months since the motion was filed, the Court can reasonably conclude
that Plaintiffs have nothing to offer that would justify then continued inaction
HI 7
To be sure, a dismissal will prejudice the Plaintiffs, who will then be foieclosed from
pui suing the lehef sought However, the Court's sense of justice is not offended because of this
outcome It was completely withm Plaintiffs' contiol to act, and they chose not to do so The
Court and defendants have been more than patient and accommodating to Plaintiffs' lequests hi
short, any "injustice resulting from this dismissal lies solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs
HI 8
The Court realizes that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction The facts of this
case, howevei, amply justify this sanction

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Tfl9
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED. This memorandum
decision shall serve as the final order and judgment m this case; the parties need not submit a
separate order.
Entered this 28th day of June, 2006.

Third DistnVpjCoiirt
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTM»T COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAlfecOUtff V^TATE OF UTAH

ROBERT AND JACKIE FACE,
Plaintiff
Civil No.:
BEUTLER ENTERPRISES, INC.,
MOBILE HOME TRANSPORTERS,
and BYRON CHESTER MOCK,

030905851

Honorable Judge Lindberg

Defendants.

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ON MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO HAVE
NEW COUNSEL RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Comes now the plaintiffs Robert and Jackie Face, who make an informal special
appearance, pursuant to Rule 6(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedures and moves the above entitled
Court for an Order granting additional time to respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated
February 13, 2006.
There having been no timely objection filed by defendants, plaintiff respectfully submits
that this motion is ripe to be decided and that another attorney is currently reviewing this matter
and could respond with this court's permission.
/ ^ ^ f l thi^27^4ay of June, 2006.

Robert Face

|

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I certify on this 27th day of June, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ON MOTION FOR
ADDITIONAL TIME TO HAVE NEW COUNSEL RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS" to be delivered by inserting the above referenced document
in a sealed envelope and placing the same in the United States Postal System
addressed to the following:

US MAIL Postage Prepaid

Robert Face

2

PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
Terry M. Plant
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